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INTRODUCTION
The enforcement of competition rules including merger control remains one of the most important EU policies contributing to the functioning of the Internal Market, strengthening the competitiveness of the European economies and according wider choice and lower prices to consumers. The EU has consistently required that the candidate countries become accustomed to a competition framework similar to that of the EU well before the date of accession. The Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) all adopted their competition laws more than ten years prior to their accession to the EU in 2004. 1 In the field of merger control the Baltic jurisdictions have been closely following the EU developments and after the adoption of the new EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), 2 which modified the substantive test used for the appraisal of concentrations, all three countries introduced respective amendments in their competition legislation. 3 The reform of competition laws in these countries was also inspired by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 4 The harmonization of the national legislation with EU standards and practices has signalled the intention of the Baltic states to follow the EU's guidance in the domestic competition enforcement. 5 At the same time some authors have questioned the extent to which the implementation of the EU competition rules in these countries should take into account the local circumstances such as the size of the economy. 6 According to Gal, the prevalence of the concentrated market structures in a small market economy requires a distinct set of rules that would 3 For the discussion on reform of the merger control regimes in the Baltic countries see Jurgita Malinauskaite, "Development of merger control in the Baltic countries: over 10 years of experience: Part 2," E.C.L.R. 32(3) (2011): 109. 4 The Estonian Competition Act reads as follows: "For the purposes of this Act, an undertaking in a dominant position is undertaking which accounts for at least 40% of the turnover of the goods market or whose position enables the undertaking to operate in the market to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, suppliers and buyers" ( (Konkurrensverket, 2002) .
by providing a comparative study on the merger remedies practices in these jurisdictions. The present work attempts to verify whether the trends and tendencies in merger remedies enforcement in the Baltics support the above mentioned policy statements related to the design of merger control in the small market economies and their consistency with the EU standards and practices. It is based on the analysis of the individual merger decisions issued by the national competition authorities (NCAs) of Estonia (EECA), 11 Latvia (LVCA) 12 and Lithuania (LTCA), 13 as well as on the statistics of merger control enforcement in these countries in 2004-2011 (starting from the year when they became the Member
States of the EU).
14 In order to place the study in the EU and international context, the paper first provides an overview of the ongoing discussion on the types of remedies that are appropriate in various legal, economic and institutional settings. Secondly, it analyzes the statistical data on merger enforcement in the Baltic countries. Thirdly, we compare the approaches followed by the Baltic NCAs in the following four Finally, we conclude our analysis by summarizing the identified enforcement trends and formulate certain policy recommendations aimed at harmonizing the merger remedies practices in the Baltic countries and encouraging further research and collaboration in this domain.
MERGER REMEDIES FOR A SMALL MARKET ECONOMY: STRUCTURAL OR BEHAVIORAL?
The analysis of the EU merger remedies practice suggests that the EU Commission in its more than 300 merger remedies decisions has consistently focused on the effectiveness of the proposed commitments. 15 As a result, the EU 17 Ibid., Article 13: "the commitments which are structural in nature, such as the commitment to sell a business unit, are, as a rule, preferable from the point of view of the Merger Regulation's objective, inasmuch as such commitments prevent, durably, the competition concerns which would be raised by the merger as notified, and do not, moreover, require medium or long-term monitoring measures". 18 Ibid., Article 13. 19 Remedies Guide the behavioral remedies are a "valuable tool" because "they can preserve a merger's potential efficiencies, and, at the same time, remedy the competitive harm that otherwise would result from the merger". 24 The acceptance of behavioral remedies has been also acknowledged on the international level. The discussion on merger remedies carried out at the 2004 OECD roundtable was concluded with the observation that although there was a general preference for structural remedies, it was not obvious that the latter are more efficient and less costly. 25 In 2005 the ICN Merger Working Group recommended the application of behavioral remedies under certain circumstances. 26 At the 2011 OECD roundtable on remedies in merger cases it was pointed out that the success of a structural divestiture depends largely (if not exclusively) on the existence of suitable purchasers interested in acquiring the assets to be divested. 27 The ongoing financial and economic turmoil has emphasized the fact that there may be circumstances when there are simply no purchasers interested in such assets.
In addition to the general considerations, which can affect the choice of merger remedies, one should also consider the specifics of the domestic market, as well as the institutional capacities and legal powers of the NCAs. It has been argued that in small economies the structural remedies have limited effectiveness as they prevent highly-efficient dominant firms from competing aggressively or from taking 29 It should be also noted that in small jurisdictions it is sometimes problematic to implement structural remedies simply because the consolidated nature of certain industries excludes most incumbents from being considered as potential purchasers of the divested assets. In light of these constraints, which may limit the use of structural remedies, the NCAs increasingly consider the possibility of accepting behavioral remedies. 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MERGER REMEDIES PRACTICES IN THE BALTIC STATES
The statistics of merger control enforcement in the Baltic countries demonstrate a significant difference in the total number of concentrations notified in Estonia and Latvia on one hand and Lithuania on the other, 31 which is partly due to the difference in mandatory notification thresholds. The Latvian competition authority first addressed the network access problem in 2002 when it examined the effects of the Telia/Sonera merger, which was conditionally cleared by the EU Commission. 37 In Latvia, which at that time was not yet a member of the EU, the merger resulted in a monopoly in the market for access to the international telecom services. The divestment of a stand-alone business was under consideration but the LVCA noted that the independent provider still required access to Telia's global telecom network, without which it would be less competitive. The LVCA finally opted for a set of behavioral remedies and imposed network access obligations for the period of three years following the concentration.
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The same merger has been reviewed by the competition authority in Lithuania where the merging multinationals were controlling the dominant fixed telecommunications services provider AB Lietuvos telekomas and a significant player in the mobile telecommunications services market AB Omnitel. Although the two markets were not overlapping, the LTCA was concerned about the fact that economies of scale and new technologies would strengthen the position of the merged entity in both markets. The remedy chosen by the LTCA can be labelled 35 ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1 2013
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Telia/Sonera concentration, which involved the consolidation of two large multinationals already present on the Baltic markets, the LVCA and the LTCA have both resorted to behavioral remedies in order to assure network access for independent providers (the concentration did not raise concerns in Estonia). The significance of the concentration (also reviewed by the EU Commission) 46 could have played a role in the NCAs' decision to abstain from requiring structural divestitures. In the second wave of telecom mergers where local incumbents were acquiring independent operators, all of the Baltic competition authorities have required structural remedies that would allow the preservation of competition in the affected network industries.
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES
On the alcoholic beverages markets in the Baltic countries the domestically manufactured products are competing with the imported ones. Foreign producers are usually present in the Baltic markets through their local subsidiaries (distributors and wholesalers), who in turn sell the products to supermarkets, discounters and smaller stores. In the Baltic states the sale of alcoholic beverages (including those with high alcohol content) is not limited to special stores as it is the case in the Nordic countries. 47 In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania alcoholic beverages can be bought from any regular retail locations. The above mentioned factors stimulate competition both at the wholesale and retail segments of the market. The merger control in this economic sector encountered both horizontal and vertical concerns. For example, potential competition problems may arise in situations where at the production level there is a dominant undertaking (or undertaking with a significant market power) or when at the wholesale level a single wholesaler has a diverse portfolio with many popular trademarks, which would significantly reduce competition at the wholesale level.
The Estonian merger control accounts for only a single case where merger remedies were accepted in the market for alcoholic beverages. The parties had horizontally overlapping activities in the markets for production and sale of long drink and cider. At the time of the investigation the cider market had been developing fast and expanding. There were no substantial entry barriers and the potential competitors, such as wine and beer producers, submitted to the EECA that they could adapt their production lines for the production of cider. Due to the 46 Telia/Sonera, supra note 37. 47 In Finland, alcoholic beverages stronger than 4,7% can be sold only in Alko stores (national alcohol retail monopoly), In Sweden, only the state-owned Systembolaget can sell alcoholic beverages stronger than 3,5%. In Norway, the alcoholic beverages stronger than 4,75% can be purchased exclusively in Vinmonopolet stores.
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In Latvia, the LVCA was concerned with input foreclosure scenarios where a new vertically integrated company would acquire control over the largest manufacturer of alcoholic beverages in Latvia. In order to prevent the exclusion of competing retailers, the LVCA decided to resort to behavioral remedies. It has obliged the merged entity for the period of five years: (1) to provide all third parties with explicit and uniform provisions regarding the discounts, bonuses, prices, terms of payment, and credit limitations; and (2) to assure that any third party can purchase the merged entity's products in the amount and assortment required by the former. 50 In another merger case the LVCA set out to address the portfolio effects stemming from the concentration of a wide range of products under the control of a dominant wholesaler. In view of the competition authority, the product portfolio as well as the terms and conditions of cooperation offered by the merging parties to the retail chains, could discourage the latter from switching the suppliers or acquiring certain products from the competing wholesalers. In order to mitigate the expected portfolio effects, the LVCA prohibited the merging parties from distributing or storing sparkling wines and "Martini" for the period of five years following the specified concentration.
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In Lithuania the alcoholic beverages market is notable for the fact that it was in this sector that for the first time the LTCA imposed structural remedies in a merger case. The concentration concerned the acquisition by Carlsberg of three Lithuanian breweries, which would bring the market share of the merged entity up to 60% of the beer production market (or more than 90% in the premium beer 48 AS A. Le Coq/OÜ Finelin, EECA (11.11.2003 , no. 38-KO); see Kaarli Eichhorn, "The Estonian Competition Authority cleared a merger in the cider market with a commitment not to increase production above specified levels (A. Le Coq/Finelin)," e-Competitions 20956 (2003) . 49 Interestingly enough, during the year following the concentration, the cider market experienced significant growth and due to the restriction on the production volumes, the main competitor of the parties to the concentration was able to significantly increase its market share. The EECA was asked to re-open the case and increase the limits on production volumes. 
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS
The typical structural setting on the markets for certain construction materials in the Baltics includes a dominant producer in the upstream market (for example, the production of cement The Estonian merger control accounts for a single case where merger remedies were accepted in a construction materials merger. The merging parties were active in the market for production and sale of ready-mixed concrete. In addition to that, the acquirer had a dominant position in the market for the production and sale of cement, which is an input for the production of ready-mixed concrete. The EECA concluded that the notified concentration did not significantly restrict competition in the market for the production and sale of ready-mixed concrete. Nevertheless, it expressed general concerns regarding vertically affected markets. Although the EECA did not formally raise competition concerns in the vertically integrated markets, it recommended to the merging parties to assume an obligation to comply with the mandatory competition rules and treat the buyers belonging to the group and the buyers not belonging to the group equally in equivalent transactions (in other words, not to abuse their dominance). The parties have followed the EECA's recommendation and the clearance decision was issued with the public promise of the merging parties not to abuse their dominant position.
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The LVCA was faced with the task of preserving competition on the market for asphalt when a merger of two construction companies was notified in 2008. The creation of dominance or substantial lessening of competition was viewed as unlikely because the amount of asphalt to be produced depended on the volume of construction works to be performed. Nevertheless, since competition on the market of road construction and maintenance was weak, the LVCA decided to safeguard the position of smaller competitors by imposing the following behavioral remedy. The merging parties were obliged to sell asphalt to all interested third parties on transparent and non-discriminatory terms and market prices. 57 Although this remedy had to be maintained until July 2013 there were no reporting obligations attached to it.
In Lithuania, the merger remedies imposed on the market for construction materials concerned cement, an input used in the production of concrete and ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1 2013
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address the potential anti-competitive effects of the concentration was behavioral:
the merged entity was obliged to apply non-discriminatory pricing and other trading conditions in transactions with the third parties.
58
The similarity of the competitive concerns in the market for construction materials pre-determined the identical remedies accepted by the Baltic NCAs. In each merger case where vertical input foreclosure was at issue, the competition authorities unanimously opted for behavioral commitments in the form of transparency and non-discrimination obligations. ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1 2013
PHARMACEUTICALS
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preventing the wholesalers from taking over the retail segment and eliminating independent pharmacies and pharmacy chains.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The comparative analysis of the merger control statistics and the NCAs' approach to merger remedies in the selected markets demonstrate a high degree of coherence among the Baltic states. In all of the four selected markets characterized by similar competition concerns observed in all three target jurisdictions, the NCAs have been almost unanimously accepting the same types (structural or behavioral) of merger remedies. For example, the analysis of merger remedies in the markets for alcoholic beverages and construction materials demonstrates that Baltic NCAs have addressed vertical foreclosure risks with behavioral remedies in the form of transparency and non-discrimination obligations. In the highly regulated markets such as telecommunications and pharmaceuticals retail, where significant market entry barriers persist, the NCAs opted for structural solutions requiring the merging parties to divest the networks (telecom) or certain retail locations (pharmacies).
Both the statistical data on merger control enforcement and the comparative analysis of the particular markets indicate that there is no pre-determined preference for any type of remedies exhibited by the Baltic NCAs; rather they have been applied on a case-by-case basis. As suggested in the above mentioned works on competition law enforcement in small market economies, the NCAs in the Baltic countries demonstrated sufficient flexibility as far as the design of the appropriate remedies is concerned. 63 This can partially support the above mentioned proposals that small market economies should be more prepared to apply behavioral remedies as an alternative to structural commitments.
Despite the formal harmonization of competition laws with the EU models and standards, the enforcement practice in the field of merger remedies in the Baltic states demonstrates a certain divergence from the approach outlined in the EU Remedies Notice. None of the Baltic NCAs has developed their own remedies guidelines and one would expect that the EU Remedies Notice is followed. However, unlike the EU Commission's preference for structural remedies as a one-time solution for structural problems caused by market concentration, the Baltic NCAs demonstrated their willingness to accept behavioral remedies as a solution for postmerger competition problems. Despite the EU Commission's emphasis on 63 As displayed in the comparative table of the Annex 1, in Latvia and Lithuania the proportion of behavioral remedies in the total number of merger remedies decisions is quite high. In Estonia this proportion is only 33% but any conclusions in relation to this jurisdiction would be premature due to very scarce experience with merger remedies (only 3 merger remedies decisions adopted in the reference period). One of the strong arguments against such an approach to remedies would be the fact that in small concentrated markets where the NCAs have limited resources for monitoring the accepted behavioral commitments, the feedback and reaction by competitors and consumers becomes especially important. Unfortunately, this aspect is often neglected when the accepted behavioral remedies are described in a general and concise manner, which does not provide a clear understanding of remedies to the third parties.
The experience of the Baltic states with merger remedies suggests that more attention should be accorded to the quality of the assessment and monitoring of behavioral commitments, since they are being adopted in a substantial number of cases. In this respect a possible collaboration of the Baltic NCAs for the development of the common merger remedies guidelines, which would address the significant role of behavioral remedies in the merger control of these jurisdictions, should be encouraged. As far as the research community is concerned, the effectiveness of the remedies, especially behavioral ones, in the small market economies should be further explored in order to provide a more definitive assessment of the emerging tendencies identified in the present paper. 
